Henry Kissinger, the puffed-up blowhard whose framework of "peace with honor" left the US with no honor, and the Vietnamese people with no peace, has come out of the woodwork to claim that there is no military victory possible in Iraq.
"If you mean by 'military victory' an Iraqi Government that can be
established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets the
civil war under control and sectarian violence under control in a time
period that the political processes of the democracies will support, I
don't believe that is possible,"
And on this subject, he is 100% correct, blowhard or not.
The military cannot, and should not, be responsible for establishing an Iraqi Government, period. The military victory that was possible in Iraq has already happened. The Democrats, as a general rule knowing nothing whatsoever about the military and it's correct uses, successfully embarrassed the Bush administration after the whole "mission accomplished" scenario on the aircraft carrier Lincoln back in May of 2003. The truth of the matter is that the Lincoln and her crew had accomplished their mission. The Lincoln and her crew had helped defeat Saddam Hussein's Baathist forces. That is exactly what a military force can do. What the Lincoln and her crew could never do is exactly what the Dems think they should have done. That is, establish a stable government in Iraq.
And why not? Why can't we do exactly that which we did in Germany after WWII? We defeated the Germans militarily, then we administered the government for a few years, and helped the German people, at least those in the western part of Germany, to establish a republic. Though it took almost four years to do so, and another six years after that before the German republic was declared fully sovereign (May 5, 1955), the US Army had, in fact, helped establish a stable government in Germany.
Leaving out the obvious differences between Germans and Iraqis, what is most likely the reason for military success in Germany, with military failure (to establish a legitimate stable government) in Iraq?
There are three factors that are at work here that will preclude a military victory in Iraq like what we had in Germany. These three factors, if ignored, will continue to haunt all military victories by the US in the foreseeable future.
Unconditional Surrender - There is no substitute for unconditional surrender. And there is no better term. Germany was forced to surrender unconditionally. Iraq should have been forced to do the same. In the Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany the very first statement on the legitimacy of the military effort to establish a stable government in Germany is crystal clear; unconditional surrender. It states right up front that "The rights, power and status of the military government in Germany are based upon the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Germany." For whatever political reason, our government decided that a total surrender of Iraq was not necessary. I would have to say developments since that time have proven that to be a very bad decision. When we go to war as we did in Iraq, it should be for the military goal of total defeat and unconditional surrender. Period. Many more people may die initially because of that goal, but I believe a good case can be made that in the end, lives will be saved. This is further emphasized in the statement that "Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives.
In the conduct of your occupation and administration you should be just but firm and aloof. You will strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and population." We tried to separate the defeated Baathist regime from the Iraqi people, believing that because they suffered under Saddam, they would be better treated as a liberated nation, rather than a defeated nation. Again I would say that as a life-saving measure, we would have been better off starting out with the idea that we were occupying Iraq as a defeated nation, and that the Iraqi people were our enemies. It is likely that more realistic tactics, techniques, and procedures would have resulted from such a viewpoint. Politically, I can't imagine what the ramifications of that would have been back in the US, and quite frankly, I don't care. The political ramifications of floundering about with a half-assed policy of political correctness married to military doctrine should be self-evident.
Reduction of War-Making Capability - Paragraph 7 of the directive to General Eisenhower is very clear on the subject of reducing the Germans capability to carry on a war, and should have been reinstituted word-for-word in a directive to CFLCC in Iraq. "In your zone you will assure that all units of the German armed forces, including pare-military organizations, are dissolved as such, and that their personnel are promptly disarmed and controlled. Prior to their final disposition, you will arrest and hold all military personnel who are included under the provisions of paragraph 8. The Control Council should proclaim, and in your zone you will effectuate, the total dissolution of all military and pare-military organizations, including the General Staff, the German Officers Corps, the Reserve Corps and military academies, together with all associations which might serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany. You will seize or destroy all arms, ammunition and implements of war and stop the production thereof. You will take proper steps to destroy the German war potential, as set forth elsewhere in this directive." Because we did not view the Iraqi people as a defeated nation, we were unable to issue such a directive. Iraqi males were allowed to keep one AK-47 for personal use. Such "personal use" turns out to be not such a good idea for the coalition. The need to have issued such a proclamation is again self-evident, but is predicated on the first factor of unconditional surrender and total defeat. Without the first, you can't have the second.
Security Arrests - Again, the directive to General Eisenhower should have been used as a template for any directive to CFLCC. "You will search out, arrest, and hold, pending receipt by you of further instructions as to their disposition, Adolf Hitler, his chief Nazi associates, other war criminals and all persons who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes. All persons who, if permitted to remain at large would endanger the accomplishment of your objectives will also be arrested and held in custody until trial by an appropriate semi-judicial body to be established by you.... In no event shall any differentiation be made between or special consideration be accorded to persons arrested, either as to manner of arrest or conditions of detention, upon the basis of wealth or political, industrial, or other rank or position."
The need to seek out, then arrest or kill, ex-Baathists was clear, and the military has done a superb job of it. What was not so evident, unless one were to, say, go back and read how it was done successfully in the past, was the need to also arrest and detain all other persons who would endanger the accomplishment of military objectives. In Iraq, that would include Muqtada Al Sadr and hundreds of other Shia and Sunni imams who daily preach hatred towards other muslims, America, the Coalition, infidels, whatever. In the military, we have a term called "center of gravity" which loosely means that object from which the enemy derives its strength. In the case of Iraq, the center of gravity is the imams who preach hatred. They are allowed to do it daily, with extra emphasis on Friday. It is clear that Marshall understood this when he issued this directive to Eisenhower because the directive does not stop at getting rid of the Nazis, it specifically goes on to authorize him to arrest and detain all those who would jeopardize his military mission. The same directive, issued to CFLCC in Iraq, was needed. It just wasn't possible without first declaring Iraq to be a defeated nation, rather than a liberated nation. We didn't worry too much about saving "German culture" back then, and we shouldn't be so quick to try to save islamic fascist culture now, either.
These are not new ideas, obviously. But they have been forgotten over time. If the Democratic-controlled Congress plans on establishing a new direction for our effort in Iraq, they could at least make an attempt to look at those efforts that have succeeded in the past. Instead, they tend to focus on Viet Nam, which is a shame, since it has so little to show the civilian leadership on how to focus efforts for a successful post-hostilities engagement of the military. It may in fact be Viet Nam all over again if the Democrats have their way. But it doesn't have to be that way, and we have reason to believe that the Coalition can successfully establish a stable republic given the proper guidance from those civilians in charge because we have done it before.
If the Dems want this to be another Viet Nam, they can easily make it a self-fulfilling prophecy by playing the part the Dems played in 1975. However, the Dems can make this another Germany by playing the part the Dems played in 1945. It's their choice now, as Kissinger has made clear. It's not a military option to stay and produce a stable Iraqi government through more troops, or more bombs, or even more money. What is needed now is the political backbone to establish the necessary conditions for a political victory in Iraq. A social victory in Iraq. An economic victory in Iraq. The military is still needed in Iraq, but they have done all they can do towards establishing a stable republic. The civilians need to take charge now and issue clear concise directives like they used to.
The Dems begged to be given the chance; let's see if they want the US and Iraqi people to be victorious a la 1945, or defeated, a la 1975.
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